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Foreign policy – the EU’s external relations - is not the only area in which 
Polish Members of the European Parliament have made their mark. 
They have managed to inﬂ uence a number of important parliamentary 
decisions regarding questions such as energy or cohesion policy. This is 
one of the main conclusions of the report published by the Institute of 
Public Affairs, summarising the activities of Polish MEPs in the ﬁ rst half 
of the seventh term (July 2009 to December 2011).  
The IPA experts analysed the political position, the main achievements 
and the methods employed by Polish MEPs. Their activities were 
presented against the back ground of the key debates that took place 
in the European Parliament. The wider context makes it possible to 
provide a better assessment of the position occupied by the Poles in the 
political landscape of the chamber, and of the extent to which the ﬁ nal 
parliamentary decisions reﬂ ected the ideas advocated by the Polish 
MEPs. 
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (IPA) is a leading Polish think tank and an
independent centre for policy research and analysis, established 
in 1995. Our mission is to contribute to informed public debate on key 
Polish, European and global policy issues. Our main areas of study 
include European policy, social policy, civil society, migration 
and development policy as well as law and democratic institutions.
The IPA has a team of in-house researchers/policy analysts and an 
extensive network of associate experts from academia and other paths 
of life. We publish the results of our projects in research reports, policy 
papers and books, which are broadly disseminated among members 
of parliament, government ofﬁ cials and civil servants, academics, 
journalists and civil society activists.
FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION (FES), based in Berlin and Bonn, employs 
around 600 staff members and maintains representative ofﬁ ces in 
100 countries. The Foundation’s ofﬁ ce in Warsaw, Poland has been 
working since 1990. By fostering social dialogue and civil society and 
reinforcing democracy, pluralism, and integration with the EU, as well 
as economic and political advancement, the Foundation contributes to 
the strengthening of partnership and cooperation between Poland and 
Germany.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 Polish members of the European Parliament (MEPs) started the 
seventh term as a group with a stronger position and greater political 
potential than four years earlier. Each party that won mandates 
had experienced, former MEPs in its ranks. The representatives of 
eurosceptic parties, who in the previous term had made their names 
mostly by pronouncing anti-integration tirades, failed to secure re-
election. Seventy percent of Polish MEPs are members of the two 
largest and most inﬂ uential political groups in the chamber (up 
from 44% during the previous term). 
 The Polish delegation in the European People’s Party Group 
increased signiﬁ cantly, which strengthened the Polish MEPs’ ability 
to make a difference in the position of the EP’s largest political 
group. 
 An analysis of reports written by Polish MEPs warrants some positive 
conclusions. Polish MEPs managed to make their mark on various 
policy areas: apart from relations with the Eastern neighbours, a long-
time Polish forte, Poles authored important reports regarding energy 
policy and the EU budget. The majority of MEPs who are serving 
a second term continue to work in the same committees and the 
reports that they generated reﬂ ect their well-established position. 
Some of the newly-elected MEPs also became rapporteurs which 
can be seen as a sign of quick adaptation. However, in comparison 
with other large member states, Poland has the lowest ratio of 
rapporteurs to MEPs (for instance, while 56% of Spanish MEPs 
were rapporteurs, only 33% of Polish parliamentarians gained that 
position). 
 Decisions adopted by the European Parliament on key issues were 
close to the stance defended by Polish MEPs (or the majority of 
them). The chamber called for a bigger budget for the 2014-20 period 
in which the CAP and the cohesion policy maintain priority positions, 
supported the quick signature of an association agreement with 
Ukraine, contributed to the reform of the neighbourhood policy while 
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emphasising the importance of the promotion of democracy, and 
advocated closer cooperation between member states in the realm 
of energy policy. 
 Analysis of membership in parliamentary committees and delegations 
shows a keen interest of Polish MEPs in relations with the Eastern 
neighbours. Polish MEPs authored a number of reports and through 
tabling amendments took a very active part in the drawing up of 
parliamentary decisions. 
 Emphasising the importance of the cohesion policy was a very 
important motif that featured in many of the Polish MEPs' 
contributions, not only in the debates treating the subject directly, but 
also in those related to the economic crisis and the new Multiannual 
Financial Framework. 
 The energy policy also enjoyed the keen attention of Polish MEPs. The 
decisions taken by the chamber, especially those contained in the 
Regulation on the security of gas supply, reﬂ ected the key demands 
of Polish MEPs and cemented the common energy policy in its 
internal and external dimensions. 
 On the issue of climate policy Polish MEPs adopted a defensive 
strategy, consisting of countering the calls put forward by left-wing 
political groups aimed at formulating more demanding targets 
regarding energy efﬁ ciency and the ﬁ ght against global warming. 
 As regards the most important issues debated by the chamber in the 
ﬁ rst half of the seventh term, Polish MEPs from all the political parties 
present in the chamber supported very similar views. 
 Relatively few Polish MEPs were members of the parliamentary 
committees that dealt with the issues of the economic and ﬁ nancial 
crisis. The contribution of Polish MEPs to the debates related to these 
subjects was modest. 
 The political position in the chamber inﬂ uences the approach to 
parliamentary duties. The MEPs who are members of the largest 
political groups focus on participation in the legislative process. 
Meanwhile, members of the smaller Conservative Group, who have 
limited access to reports and who are often critical of the decisions 
shaped by the largest groups, lend an interventionist angle to their 
work by often speaking in plenary and formulating a large number of 
questions to the European Commission and the EU Council. 
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7 A review of key debates suggests that MEPs from the largest old 
member states remain the most inﬂ uential players in the chamber. 
They get the most important rapporteurships and hold key positions 
in political groups. This is hardly surprising as these MEPs represent 
the member states with the greatest demographic and economic 
potential, and can usually boast a much longer parliamentary 
experience than representatives of the new member states. 
 A number of Polish MEPs, most of them members of the ECR Group, 
remained very involved in national politics. Two schisms in the major 
Polish opposition party, the Law and Justice party, were provoked by 
MEPs. The conﬂ icts on the national political scene arguably limited 
the ability of MEPs who had won mandates as candidates of the Law 
and Justice to cooperate as parliamentarians.
The seventh term of the European Parliament marked the second 
term with Polish representation in the chamber. An early Polish success 
was Jerzy Buzek’s election as President of the European Parliament. While 
his election had a symbolic signiﬁ cance, demonstrating that politicians 
from the new member states can play leading roles in the EU, it did not 
mean that Polish MEPs could hope for privileged treatment. Much the 
contrary, it could be argued that the MEPs elected in Poland in 2009 have 
faced a tougher challenge than their predecessors in 2004. Their task 
is not only to cement the position gained by the Poles in the previous 
term, but also to vie for inﬂ uence in policy areas in which Poles had not 
been very active before. After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the 
EP strengthened its position in the EU decision-making process, so the 
stakes are even higher. 
The present article is a summary of the activities of Polish MEPs in 
the ﬁ rst half of the seventh term (i.e., from June 2009 to December 2011). 
It consists of two parts. The ﬁ rst part presents the position occupied by 
Polish MEPs in the political landscape of the chamber, analyses their 
achievements, depicts the methods that they have employed to achieve 
their aims, and shows the factors that thwart effective action in the 
chamber. The second part aims at a more in-depth presentation of the 
key debates that took place in the EP, and of the role played by Polish 
MEPs in these debates. By analysing the decision-making process, we 
want to show the actions undertaken by Polish representatives in the 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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wider context of the main political cleavages existing in EU politics. We 
have attempted as well to assess the Polish input into those debates and 
ascertain to what extent the ﬁ nal decisions of the EP reﬂ ected the ideas 
presented by the Poles. We argue that foreign policy, the EU’s external 
relations, is not the only area in which Polish MEPs have made their mark. 
They have managed to inﬂ uence a number of parliamentary decisions 
regarding questions such as energy or cohesion policy. 
An exhaustive analysis of all debates that have taken place in the 
chamber is beyond the scope of this article. The authors have decided 
to focus on four policy areas: 1) external relations, 2) the ﬁ nancial crisis 
and the beginning of negotiations of the new Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014-2020, 3) energy and climate policy, and 4) cohesion 
policy. When making this selection the authors took into consideration 
two key criteria: we wanted the issues under analysis to be of crucial 
importance for the future of the EU and/or to be among the questions 
frequently characterised as priorities by Polish politicians. Consequently, 
the issues analysed largely overlap with the priorities of the Polish 
Presidency of the EU Council. Our selection, however, does not mean that 
we consider the MEPs active in these policy areas as more effective or 
more important. Nor do we aim at creating an exhaustive summary of all 
the activities undertaken by every single MEP. The focus of our analysis 
is on the activities aimed at inﬂ uencing the legislative decisions of the 
chamber. 
The present article was created on the basis of interviews with 12 
Polish MEPs and three administrators working for the EP, data published 
on the website of the EP and data furnished by Vote Watch, an organisation 
which prepares statistical analyses of voting records in the EP. 
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POLISH MEPS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
P o l i s h  M E P s ’  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  c h a m b e r
Nineteen Polish MEPs were re-elected for a second term. This is not a 
very high number: the Spanish, for instance, have 26 re-elected MEPs in a 
delegation of the same size.1 It should be noted, however, that as many as 
four Polish political parties, which had had MEPs in the sixth term, did not 
manage to gain mandates in this term. Even though the turnover among 
Polish MEPs can be described as relatively high, the majority of MEPs who 
had been considered by journalists and academics as being the most 
effective secured re-election. Among the MEPs elected for the ﬁ rst time 
in 2009 there were several politicians with considerable EU experience 
led by the former European Commissioner, Danuta Hübner. National 
MPs who had decided to swap national mandates for European ones 
represented a large group among the newly elected MEPs (17 in number). 
Two academics and several politicians with experience in local politics 
completed the contingent. All in all, at the outset of the term the Polish 
contingent, with a group of experienced former MEPs and some leading 
politicians from the national political scene, could be considered as a 
group with considerable potential to inﬂ uence parliamentary decisions. 
The structure of Polish MEPs’ membership in political groups is 
noticeably different when compared to the previous term. In the sixth 
term of the EP Poles were scattered among many political groups with 
relatively few of them belonging to the two largest and most inﬂ uential 
groups (the centre-right Group of the European People’s Party-Christian 
Democrats – EPP, and the centre-left Group of Progressive Socialists and 
Democrats – S&D).2 In contrast, Polish MEPs started the current term 
as members of only three political groups, which made them the most 
1 At the beginning of the current term both countries had delegations of 50 
MEPs. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Spanish delegation 
grew to 54 MEPs, while Poland gained one additional seat. 
2 The two largest groups account for 61% of all MEPs. The ﬁ nal decisions of 
the chamber often reﬂ ect a compromise forged between the two groups. 
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concentrated national contingent amongst the large states.3 Such 
a concentration can present both advantages and disadvantages. While it 
is clearly positive that there are no Polish MEPs among the non-attached 
MEPs who are largely deprived of any inﬂ uence over parliamentary 
decisions, the absence of Polish representatives in the Liberal Group 
(ALDE) can be seen as a drawback. The Liberals are the third largest group 
of the chamber and in the case of a divergence of views between the 
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, their votes usually can tip 
the balance. The most important feature as regards group membership 
is the signiﬁ cant increase of the percentage of Polish MEPs who are 
members of two largest groups (EPP and S&D). Currently 70% of Polish 
MEPs are members of those groups, up from 44% during the last term (see 
Table 1 below). In this respect the Poles rank higher than the British, the 
French and the Germans. The Polish result becomes less impressive when 
the ALDE Group is included in the count, but it is still much better than 
the previous term. 
State
Percentage of MEPs in the EPP 
and S&D Groups (%)
Percentage of MEPs in the EPP, 
S&D and ALDE Groups (%)
2004–2009 2009–2014 2004–2009 2009–2014
Germany 72 65 79 77
France 62 59 75 68
United Kingdom 59 18 73 34
Italy 52 76 68 84
Spain 88 88 92 92
Poland 44 70 55 70
Hungary 91 81 100 81
Czech Republic 66 41 66 41
The reason for that change is a signiﬁ cant growth of the Polish 
delegation in the EPP Group (the number of Poles among the Social 
Democrats fell from nine to seven MEPs). This term the Polish delegation, 
composed of 25 Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) MEPs 
and four MEPs representing the agrarian Polish People’s Party (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL), is the fourth largest national contingent, 
trailing the French by only one MEP. Obviously quantity does not 
necessarily mean quality, but the greater numerical strength has 
3 Italian MEPs are present in four groups, German MEPs – in ﬁ ve, Spanish 
– in six, while the French and the British are present in seven groups. 
Table 1. 
MEPs from selected 
member states in the 
largest political groups 
Source: own calculations 
based upon data available 
on the website of the EP 
(http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/meps/en/
search.html)
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undeniably brought some advantages. The Poles can have at least one 
MEP in each of the 22 parliamentary committees and subcommittees, 
and thus can closely follow their work. In negotiations that take place 
within the political group, the bigger numbers translate into greater 
visibility, greater capacity to engineer coalitions with representatives 
of other countries and, most importantly, more votes. Larger number 
of MEPs also have allowed access to posts. First of all, the strong Polish 
delegation reinforced Jerzy Buzek’s bid for the presidency of the chamber. 
In addition, Filip Kaczmarek in the Development Committee and Tadeusz 
Zwiefka in the Legal Affairs Committee took the important posts of group 
coordinators.4
MEPs who obtained their mandates as representatives of the Law and 
Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) started the term as members 
of the smaller group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). 
The group was created as a result of the British Conservatives and the 
Czech Civic Democratic Party having left the EPP Group. The PiS MEPs had 
been trying to precipitate the creation of a conservative and moderately 
eurosceptic group since the beginning of the previous term, but it was 
only the change of strategy of the British Conservatives that made this 
project possible. Apart from the British, the Czechs and the Polish MEPs, 
the ECR Group is composed of single representatives of six other states. 
Although at ﬁ rst sight the group represents a bigger political potential 
than the Union for the Europe of Nations Group, to which the Law and 
Justice MEPs had belonged in the previous term, the change is not that 
signiﬁ cant. With 53 members the ECR is not strong enough to be able to 
shake the balance of power built around the 2+1 constellation (EPP, S&D 
+ ALDE). Moreover, the relatively serious divergences between its main 
parties make it impossible for the group to adopt a common position 
on some important issues.5 The main beneﬁ t for Polish MEPs in ECR is 
the opportunity to cooperate with a number of British MEPs who have 
a long experience of parliamentary politics and a strong position in the 
chamber. 
4 Group coordinators oversee the work of all MEPs from the political group 
in committee. They can inﬂ uence such issues as the distribution of reports or 
the common position of the group. 
5 One example of such divergences may be the report on the new Multian-
nual Financial Framework, rejected by the British and Czech Conservatives, 
but supported by Polish members of the group. 
POLISH MEPS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
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Just as had happened in the previous term, some Polish MEPs decided 
to change group membership during the ﬁ rst half of the seventh 
term. These changes were brought about by developments in national 
politics. MEPs Zbigniew Ziobro, Tadeusz Cymański and Jacek Kurski were 
the most vocal among the Law and Justice members who questioned 
the leadership of the party chairman, Jarosław Kaczynśki, after the 
electoral defeat in 2011.6 Unable to topple the chairman, they decided 
to leave the party and create a new formation called Solidarna Polska. 
In December 2011 they announced their departure from the ECR Group 
and their intention to join the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group 
that unites eurosceptic MEPs. In an ofﬁ cial statement, the MEPs claimed 
that the change will make it easier “to fulﬁ l the programme of defending 
Polish interests in the EU,” but it can be assumed that a desire by these 
well known politicians to cut ties with PiS on the European arena was 
also an important reason for the defection. 
The events described above are another example of how similarly 
to the previous term a number of MEPs remain very much involved 
in national politics. Interestingly, the MEPs Paweł Kowal and Marek 
Migalski were also key ﬁ gures in another split that occurred within PiS 
in 2010. In the parliamentary election of 2011, the governing PO and 
the strongest opposition party PiS chose MEPs as campaign heads. The 
animosities that developed on the national political scene affected 
the ability of the PiS MEPs to cooperate. In January of 2012 the Polish 
delegation in the ECR Group (composed of MEPs from the PiS and the 
Polska Jest Najważniejsza party, created after ﬁ rst schism in PiS) was not 
able to agree upon one candidate for the post of Vicepresident of the EP. 
As a result the intragroup election was won by the Czech candidate. 
T w o  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  r o l e
The data published on the website of the EP summarises some 
parliamentary activities.7 As easily accessible and quantiﬁ able data, it 
6 Having been ousted from power in the 2007 election, the Law and 
Justice party lost to its principal rival, the Civic Platform, again in 2011. In the 
meantime the party chief, Jarosław Kaczyński, lost the presidential election of 
2010 as well. 
7 The following activities are listed: speeches in plenary, reports, opinions, 
questions, motions for resolutions and written declarations. 
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has been widely used in analyses assessing MEPs’ performance. Yet, the 
debates around the articles published in Poland during the previous term 
clearly demonstrated that this data reﬂ ects only certain – not necessarily 
key – aspects of MEPs’ activities and placing too much reliance on it 
could lead to erroneous judgements. The number of speeches in plenary, 
for instance, does not mirror the importance and inﬂ uence of a given 
MEP. Reports and opinions are a better token of parliamentary clout 
but in this case as well some attention is in order. Some reports can 
be prepared relatively quickly and with minimal effort, while others 
demand lengthy negotiations and specialist knowledge. Although – as 
the abovementioned examples show – the quantitative analysis of data 
published on the website of the EP cannot paint a full picture of MEPs’ 
work, it can help to formulate conclusions regarding their approach to 
their duties and some achievements. 
Just as in the previous term, with respect to reports and opinions, 
members of the large political groups perform better than their colleagues 
from the smaller Conservative Group. Among Polish MEPs from the EPP 
and S&D groups 16 MEPs wrote at least one report (47% of all MEPs in 
these groups) and 24 MEPs at least one opinion (70%). In the ECR Group 
four MEPs were rapporteurs (26%) and ﬁ ve prepared an opinion (33%) (see 
Table 2 below).
Political group
Reports
(rapporteurs/all MEPs)
Opinions
(authors of opinion/ all MEPs)
EPP 12/278 20/27
S&D 4/7 4/7
ECR 4/15 5/15
A look at the names of rapporteurs shows that the majority of 
MEPs serving their second term have continued to work in the same 
committees and have capitalised on that specialisation by gaining 
reports. A number of MEPs making their European debut in the current 
term can also be found among Polish rapporteurs which can be considered 
as a sign of successful adaptation to the new political environment. 
8 Jerzy Buzek was not included since performing the duties of the President of the EP made it 
impossible for him to carry out the standard activities of an MEP. Andrzej Bratkowski who joined the 
EP in December 2011 was also excluded from the count. 
Table 2. 
Rapporteurs and authors 
of opinions among Polish 
MEPs
Source: own calculations 
based upon data available 
on the website of the EP 
(as of 5 January 2012)
POLISH MEPS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
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When the achievements of Polish MEPs in this respect are compared 
to the results of MEPs from other large countries it can be seen that the 
rapporteurs-to-all-MEPs ratio is the lowest among Polish MEPs. Poland 
is also at the bottom of the table when the average of reports per MEP 
is taken into consideration. One explanation of this outcome may be 
that the old member states beneﬁ t from the presence in their ranks of 
MEPs with parliamentary experience of several terms who – due to their 
knowledge, experience and reputation – can compete for reports more 
effectively. Polish MEPs can ﬁ nd consolation in the fact that, as previously 
stated, the number of reports authored is not always a perfect reﬂ ection 
of inﬂ uence. The very high average for Italian MEPs, for instance, is due to 
the large number of reports authored by Barbara Matera (45 reports that 
constitute 40% of all reports written by Italian MEPs). The vast majority 
of these reports concern the same issue: the functioning of the European 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund in various countries. 
Member state Percentage of rapporteurs (%) Average of reports per MEP
Germany 60 1.34
France 47 1.08
Italy 42 1.5
United Kingdom 45 1
Spain 56 1.15
Poland 33 1
As regards speeches in plenary and questions formulated by Polish 
MEPs the same trends that existed in the previous term are revealed: 
MEPs from the ECR Group took the ﬂ oor more often and formulated more 
questions than their colleagues from the large political groups.
ECR EPP S&D
Speeches in plenary 30 22 17
Questions 24 12 10
In sum, the analysis of quantiﬁ able data regarding various instruments 
of parliamentary expression leads to the conclusion that political position 
in the chamber inﬂ uences MEPs’ approach to parliamentary activities. 
Members of the largest groups focus on participation in the legislative 
process, while members of the ECR Group, who have limited access to 
Table 3. 
Rapporteurs in selected 
national delegations
Source: own calculations 
based upon data available 
on the website of Vote 
Watch (http://www.
votewatch.eu/cx_meps_
statistics.php?top_entry=2, 
last accessed 5 January 
2012)
Table 4. 
Speeches in plenary and 
questions (average per 
MEP)
Source: own calculations 
based upon data available 
on the website of the EP 
(as of 30 September 2011)
MEPs_EN.indd   14 2012-06-13   11:01:18
15
the most important reports and who often contest the compromises 
engineered by the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the 
Liberals, give a more interventionist character to their parliamentary 
work by speaking in plenary more often and formulating parliamentary 
questions to the European Commission and the EU Council.
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  g r o u p s :  a n a l y s i s  o f  v o t i n g  r e c o r d 9 
An analysis of voting record demonstrates that Polish MEPs are loyal 
members of their political groups. Members of PO and PSL support 
the position of the EPP Group in 97% of all votes, and the percentage is 
even higher – 98% – for the Polish Social Democrats who belong to the 
S&D group.10 This places the Polish delegations among the most loyal in 
their groups, though it should be mentioned that differences between 
national delegations are not very signiﬁ cant. In the EPP, the delegation of 
the Greek Nea Demokratia party, which ranks at the bottom of the loyalty 
table, supports the group line in 92% of all votes. In the S&D group, the 
Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democrats vote with the majority of 
the group on 89% of all votes. 
It is interesting to look at situations when splits occur within the 
major political groups. In the case of smaller splits in the EPP Group (i.e., 
cases when between 10 and 20% of members vote against the group line), 
the Polish delegation votes with the majority on 95% of the occasions. In 
the case of more signiﬁ cant splits (when over 20% of MEPs turns against 
the group majority), the Poles usually vote with the majority (75% of 
all votes). For the Polish delegation in the Social Democratic Group the 
indicators are 98% and 91%, respectively. This shows that Polish MEPs 
are rarely among dissenters within their political groups. This data 
can be interpreted in different ways. One can simply assume that Polish 
MEPs are ideologically close to the mainstream of their groups. Another 
explanation posits that whenever intragroup divergences appear, Poles 
are usually capable of negotiating the ﬁ nal compromise group position 
9 Data quoted in his section comes from the website of the Vote Watch or-
ganisation www.votewatch.org. 
10 Data regarding the ECR Group, a smaller group which does not ascribe as 
much importance to maintaining a common line in votes, is not discussed in 
this section. 
POLISH MEPS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
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that they can support in a vote. Finally, one can also suspect that it is 
simply the fear of going too often against the group line that is behind 
the Polish MEPs’ loyalty to the group majority. Most probably all these 
factors are true, some to a greater extent than others. All in all, it can be 
concluded that Polish delegations are relatively comfortable in their 
groups and closer to their ideological core than to the fringes. 
The voting record also shows a relatively high cohesion of Polish 
parties. PO and PSL have the highest cohesion rates11 (0.972 for both 
parties), the Social Democrats come second with a cohesion rate of 0.955, 
with representatives of Polska Jest Najważniejsza close behind (0.949). 
PiS ranks last in this category with a cohesion rate of 0.932. 
T h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P o l i s h  M E P s  i n  E P  c o m m i t t e e s
The distribution of MEPs amongst parliamentary committees may 
be treated as a reﬂ ection of their interests and priorities.12 During the 
last term Polish MEPs were under-represented in several important 
committees that produced the highest number of legal acts adopted in 
the codecision procedure giving the EP the greatest inﬂ uence over the 
ﬁ nal shape of the act (e.g., Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
- ENVI; and Industry, Research and Energy - ITRE). In the meantime, the 
Poles clearly had a preference for the Foreign Affairs Committee which, 
although prestigious, still has only limited direct inﬂ uence on the actions 
of the EU and the member states. Judging by the distribution of MEPs 
among the committees, the issues related to foreign policy and defence 
have again provoked a keen interest of Polish MEPs in the seventh term. 
Even though the over-representation in the Foreign Affairs Committee 
has disappeared, Poles are over-represented in two subcommittees 
related to that committee: the Security and Defence Subcommittee and 
the Human Rights Subcommittee. The increasing relevance of issues 
related to energy has enticed a larger number of Polish MEPs to seek 
11 Cohesion measures the extent to which the members of a party vote as a 
block or not. The higher the score, the more cohesive a party is. Data on cohe-
sion was provided to the Institute of Public Affairs by Vote Watch and is based 
on votes taken between July 2009 and September 2011.
12 It should be stressed that as not all MEPs are given membership in the 
committee that is their ﬁ rst choice; the distribution of MEPs in committees is 
not a precise indicator. 
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membership in the ITRE committee. The ENVI committee, however, 
continues to attract limited interest. Given the fact that the environment 
is the policy area where Poland faces probably the greatest risk of being 
isolated in the EU, one would expect that more Polish MEPs would work 
in this committee. On the other hand, the modest Polish presence in the 
ENVI committee reﬂ ects the still limited importance ascribed to this 
domain in Poland. Agriculture and Regional Development both have 
strong Polish presence, which is relatively unsurprising as the Common 
Agriculture Policy and the Cohesion Policy are often described by MEPs 
and politicians in Poland as key EU policies. 
Poles were under-represented in both EP committees that dealt 
with the issue of the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis: the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee and the special Financial, Economic and 
Social Crisis Committee. Danuta Hübner was the main – and virtually 
the only – Polish MEP actively involved in these debates. A number of 
reasons can explain this limited interest. The conviction that Poland is 
still immune to the crisis perhaps played a role as well as the limited 
number of MEPs with strong economic background. 
Underrepresentation Average Overrepresentation
Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety (3%)
Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection (7.7%)
Security and Defence (13%)
Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (2%)
Development (6.6%) Human Rights (9.6%)
International Trade (3.4%) Budgets (6.8%) Regional Development (12%) 
Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (1.8%)
Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality (5.8%)
Culture and Education (9.3%)
Constitutional Affairs (4%)
Industry, Research and Energy 
(7.2%)
Legal Affairs (12%)
Financial, Economic and 
Social Crisis (2.2%)
Agriculture and Rural 
Development (8.8%)
Petitions (11.4%)
Transport and Tourism (6.8%) Budgetary Control (10.3%)
Foreign Affairs (7.8%)
Fisheries (8.3%)
Employment and Social Affairs 
(6%)
Policy Challenges (8%)
A difference of at least two percentage points between the percentage 
of Polish MEPs in the committee and Polish MEPs in the chamber (6.8%) 
is considered as over- or under-representation. The percentage of Polish 
members is given in brackets.
Table 5. 
Polish MEPs in EP 
committees
Source: own calculations 
based on data available 
on the website of the EP.
POLISH MEPS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
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ACTIVITIES OF POLISH MEPS IN SELECTED POLICY AREAS
The objective of this part is to describe the participation of Polish MEPs 
in key parliamentary debates and to analyse how their ideas and aims 
relate to those defended by the major political forces in the chamber.
E x t e r n a l  p o l i c y 
Neighbourhood policy
In the ﬁ rst half of the seventh term the issues related to the EU 
neighbourhood policy, and the Eastern neighbourhood in particular, 
attracted considerable attention from Polish MEPs. The composition of 
EP delegations for cooperation with the parliaments of countries of that 
region can be seen as a token of that attention. There were ﬁ ve Polish 
MEPs among sixteen members of the EP-Ukraine delegation, including 
the chair of the delegation. A Polish MEP took the chairmanship of the 
delegation for relations with the Belarus parliament as well. Two Poles 
were present in the delegation for relations with Moldova (out of 14 
members) and in the delegation for relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia (18 members). 
The Arab Spring laid bare the weaknesses of the EU neighbourhood 
policy and prompted the European Commission to initiate its remodeling. 
The EP expressed its view in a report authored by Marek Siwiec, a 
Polish member of the S&D Group, and Mario David, a Portuguese MEP 
representing the EPP Group. A number of Polish MEPs also became 
authors of opinions for this report: Bogdan Marcinkiewicz (EPP) on behalf 
of the Research, Industry and Energy Committee, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska 
(EPP) on behalf of the Regional Development Committee, and Marek 
Migalski (ECR) on behalf of the Culture and Education Committee. 
The actions and solutions proposed by the authors of the report 
were generally in line with Polish preferences and the opinions voiced 
by Polish MEPs in the debates on the subject. The Poles could but 
welcome the calls for more developed relations with the neighbouring 
countries and more funds for the policy. Similarly, Polish MEPs supported 
the move to put more emphasis on democratic reforms. On many 
occasions the authors of the report stressed that performance in the 
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process of reforms will be an important factor determining the increase 
(or reduction) of EU aid. Many Polish MEPs voiced worries that the Arab 
Spring would draw most of the funds away from the East and towards 
the South. The report does not mention a concrete division of funds, but 
stresses the need to maintain a balance between both directions. Polish 
MEPs were probably somewhat disappointed that the report did not 
mention explicitly the membership prospects of the Eastern neighbours. 
The authors declared that “article 49 constitutes a driving force for 
reform”13 and that “association agreements can be an important step 
towards further political engagement and stronger relationship with 
Europe.”14 Yet, considering the slow progress of political and economic 
reforms in the East, EU membership is a remote prospect. Trying to 
convince the majority to adopt more far-reaching declarations could 
only antagonize the opponents of further enlargement. 
Polish MEPs tabled amendments to the David-Siwiec report, which 
gained acceptance. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski’s (EPP) amendment emphasized 
the importance of supplementing intergovernmental relations with 
twinning between various civil society bodies in the EU and the 
neighbouring countries. Krzysztof Lisek’s (EPP) amendment urged the 
Commission to present a comprehensive list of programmes from which 
the partner countries can beneﬁ t. All in all, it can be concluded that the 
review of the neighbourhood policy provoked great interest amongst 
Polish MEPs and that they managed to inﬂ uence the shape of the EP’s 
contribution. 
Another success in efforts aimed at dynamising the relationship 
between the EU and its Eastern neighbours was the creation of the 
Euronest Parliamentary Assembly uniting MEPs with parliamentarians 
from the Eastern Partnership countries. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski was the 
MEP who came up with this idea. The project could not come to fruition 
for a long time due to protracted discussions regarding the participation 
of representatives from Belarus. Taking representatives of the ofﬁ cial 
13 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that any European 
state that respects the speciﬁ c set values deﬁ ned in the Treaty may apply to 
become a member of the Union. The supporters of further enlargement invoke 
this article to claim that Eastern neighbours may in the future become mem-
bers of the EU (as opposed, for example, to the countries of Northern Africa). 
14 Report on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(2011/21579INI)), point 37. 
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parliament on board was unacceptable for the majority of MEPs, but 
the idea of inviting representatives of the opposition did not receive 
unanimous support either (the parliaments of the partner countries were 
especially sceptical about it). Finally, Euronest was inaugurated without 
the representatives of Belarus. Although the ﬁ rst ordinary session was a 
disappointment as the participants could not agree on any resolutions, 
the Euronest Assembly can be considered a potentially important forum 
that will facilitate contacts between parliamentarians and help to 
maintain the subject of the Eastern Neighbourhood on the EU agenda. 
Association agreement with Ukraine
The signature of the association agreement with Ukraine was not 
dependent on the EP’s approval, but the chamber expressed its opinion 
on it in a report written by the Polish MEP Ryszard Legutko (ECR). The trial 
and imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, former Ukrainian prime minister 
and leader of the opposition, provoked a wave of criticism directed 
at president Victor Yanukovych. Some MEPs, especially the Christian 
Democrats, the Liberals and the Greens, suggested that given the 
circumstances the agreement should not be signed. Polish MEPs were 
among those who insisted that despite the worrying developments 
in Ukrainian politics, the agreement should be initialed and signed 
for the sake of Ukrainian society. Paweł Zalewski (EPP) carried out an 
opinion poll among the major Ukrainian NGOs and think tanks which 
showed overwhelming support for the agreement. Eventually, a majority 
behind the Legutko report was secured. The report recommended that 
the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service 
make efforts to initial the agreement before the end of 2011, so that it 
could be signed by the Council in the ﬁ rst half of 2012. The MEPs also 
expressed concern regarding the treatment of Yulia Tymoshenko and 
demanded that she be permitted to participate in the political life of the 
country. 
Creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)
The debate regarding the creation of the EEAS revolved around 
contention between institutions – the EP, the EU Council and the High 
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Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – rather than 
between political groups in the chamber. The EP tried to gain inﬂ uence 
over the service in negotiations regarding the documents shaping it. It 
was agreed that any future changes of the rules regarding ﬁ nancing and 
the staff would demand the adoption of a regulation, thus guaranteeing 
that the chamber would have a say. The EP failed in its attempts to 
establish open hearings of candidates for the posts of EU ambassadors, 
which would make nominations dependent upon MEPs’ approval. The 
High Representative, Catherine Ashton, determinedly opposed such a 
proposal and eventually it was agreed that hearings will be organised 
with ambassadors only after their formal nomination. 
Polish MEPs focused on the issue of recruitment of personnel for the 
service. Some of them, mostly members of the EPP and ECR groups, argued 
that a balance between nationals of the member states was necessary, 
so that the service can enjoy the strong backing of the societies of all 
member states. Virtually all MEPs from the new member states spoke in 
the same vein during parliamentary debates devoted to the creation of 
the EEAS. Some suggested that special provisions should be introduced, 
such as national quotas, which would facilitate the achievement of 
such a balance. Their apprehension was provoked by an awareness of a 
serious underrepresentation of ofﬁ cials from the new member states in 
the European Commission’s directorate general responsible for external 
relations (DG RELEX). An analysis prepared by the ofﬁ ce of Jacek Saryusz-
Wolski on the basis of data regarding employment in EU institutions 
showed that in 2010 the nationals of new member states constituted only 
7% of DG RELEX employees and 3% of staff of the Commission delegations 
abroad. Meanwhile, according to the Kinnock index, the nationals of those 
states should constitute 26.4% of the DG RELEX team.15 Some Polish MEPs 
clearly feared that a similar underrepresentation could be replicated 
within the EEAS. The amendments included in the opinion written by Jacek 
Saryusz-Wolski on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee stipulated that 
should an underrepresentation (with the Kinnock index as reference) of 
nationals of one or more states be revealed, the High Representative 
would have the right to start a recruitment procedure solely for citizens 
15 The Kinnock index was adopted before the enlargement of 2004. It de-
ﬁ ned a target percentage for employment in EU institutions of nationals of 
each of the new member states
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of those states. Even though Saryusz-Wolski managed to ﬁ nd support for 
his proposals in committee, they were not adopted by the plenary. Finally, 
the regulation amended by the EP contained a softer formulation than 
the Polish MEPs would have liked, stating that “the staff of the EEAS 
shall comprise an appropriate and meaningful presence of nationals 
from all the Member States.”16 The MEPs who opposed quotas argued 
that this solution went against the Community spirit – so often evoked 
by Polish MEPs – according to which the nationality of ofﬁ cials should be 
a secondary matter. Yet, the underrepresentation of new member states 
in DG RELEX was indeed acute, and the actions of the Polish MEPs drew 
attention to that problem. Even though Polish MEPs did not achieve their 
goals, they managed to obtain a declaration that a fair balance between 
various nationalities is important. That declaration may be an important 
reference in 2012 when the performance of the EEAS is reviewed. 
 
T h e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s
In October 2009, a few months after the beginning of the term, a special 
Financial, Economic and Social Crisis Committee (CRIS) was created to 
carry out an in-depth analysis of the causes and possible ways out of 
the crisis. The ﬁ nal report of the committee, written by French Socialist 
MEP Pervenche Berès, was adopted in July 2011. The content of the report 
clearly shows that in the view of a majority of the committee members 
closer integration is the best way to dynamise the European economy 
and protect it against crises in the future. The report called upon member 
states to coordinate their economic, ﬁ scal and social policies more 
closely. It also suggested that the EU be given new competences in policy 
areas with transnational character, such as energy or transport. The 
strengthened Union would need a bigger budget, and the author of the 
report suggested that it could grow considerably from the current level 
of 1% of the EU’s Gross National Income to between 2.5 and 10% of GNI. 
In addition, the report supported the issue of Eurobonds and proposed 
16 Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending the Staff Regulations of Ofﬁ cials of the European 
Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other Servants of those 
Communities (COM(2010)0309 – C7-0146/2010 – 2010/0171(COD)), article 
3, paragraph 2 b. 
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the creation of the post of a Supercommissioner who would oversee the 
closer economic cooperation between member states. The ﬁ nal report 
of the CRIS committee was supported by a large majority consisting of 
the two largest political groups, the Liberals and the Greens. The British 
and Czech MEPs from the ECR Group contested it for promoting closer 
integration and a larger European budget. 
While the principal political groups managed to ﬁ nd common ground 
regarding the general guidelines for ﬁ ghting the crisis, they were unable 
to form a grand coalition in the case of concrete legislative acts. The core 
of the anti-crisis measures proposed by the European Commission was 
a legislative package usually referred to as the ‘six-pack’. The package 
caused controversy in the chamber. The left-wing political groups (Social 
Democrats, Greens and Communists) criticised it as too one-sided. In their 
view, the new rules aimed at pushing the member states to reduce debt 
and balance their budgets should have been supplemented with growth-
stimulating measures. Consequently, the Social Democrats supported 
only one out of the six acts, and abstained in one case. 
Poland has often been mentioned among the countries least affected 
by the crisis and perhaps a certain feeling of security explains the 
relatively limited involvement of Polish MEPs in the work of the CRIS 
committee. Among 45 committee members Danuta Hübner (EPP) was 
the only Polish MEP. She was also one of the eight MEPs responsible 
for writing the thematic papers that were supposed to constitute an 
important point of reference for the rapporteur. Hübner’s paper was 
entitled “The Contribution of Cohesion Policy to the Economic Recovery.” 
Drawing attention to the growth-stimulating effects of the cohesion 
policy can be described as the key element in most Polish contributions 
to the debates devoted to the crisis. 
Despite their limited contribution to the debate, Poles were alert 
to projects that could potentially limit their right to fully participate 
in it. When Pervenche Berès, in a draft report devoted to the European 
semester, suggested the creation of a special committee in which only 
MEPs representing the eurozone member countries would have the 
right to vote, Polish MEPs were among the ﬁ rst to denounce that idea. 
In the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee Danuta Hübner put 
forward an amendment that opposed the proposal. It was depicted as 
incompatible with the Treaty on the European Union and the Rules of 
MEPs_EN.indd   24 2012-06-13   11:01:18
25
Procedure of the European Parliament in an opinion written by Rafał 
Trzaskowski (EPP) on behalf of the Constitutional Affairs Committee. 
M u l t i a n n u a l  f i n a n c i a l  f r a m e w o r k  2 0 1 4 - 2 0 2 0
The EP’s position regarding the new Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) for the period between 2014 and 2020 was prepared by a special 
Policy Challenges Committee (SURE) created in spring 2010. The committee 
presented its ﬁ nal report written by Salvador Garriga Polledo, a Spanish 
member of the EPP Group, in June 2011. Unsurprisingly, the size of the 
budget was the issue that provoked a heated debate in the committee. 
Some MEPs argued that in a time of budgetary austerity in most of 
the member states the EU budget should be cut as well – members of 
the eurosceptic group and British Conservatives were the most vocal 
advocates of such views. The vast majority, however, supported the idea 
of a 5% increase (in relation to the previous framework), put forward by 
the rapporteur. 
A divergence of views occurred in relation to the structure of the 
budget, with some MEPs arguing that money invested in such areas 
as research and innovation will bring higher returns than funds spent 
on the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) or the cohesion policy that 
currently account for the majority of the EU’s spendings. Consequently, 
the proponents of this view advocated making changes in the allocation 
of funds in order to support the new priorities. Such views were defended 
by many MEPs from the Liberal Group, the British Conservatives and 
some members of the two largest groups (mainly from Northern 
European countries). A generous cohesion policy was defended chieﬂ y 
by the MEPs from the states that are its biggest beneﬁ ciaries – Eastern 
and Southern Europe. The Polledo report can be considered a success 
of those who defended the traditional structure of the budget. Even 
though the report stated that research, innovation, transport and energy 
need greater funds, it also contained a declaration that funding for the 
CAP and the cohesion policy should remain at least at the level of the 
previous ﬁ nancial framework. 
Polish MEPs had a strong representation in the SURE committee: 
Konrad Szymański (ECR) and Jan Olbrycht (EPP) were vice-chairmen of the 
committee and two other Poles were members. Poles from all political 
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groups presented a very similar view in relation to the MFF and ranked 
among the most dogged defenders of a generous budget in which the 
CAP and the cohesion policy remain prioritised. The ﬁ nal shape of the 
Polledo report was in line with the key Polish demands and Polish MEPs 
unanimously supported that report. 
E n e r g y  a n d  c l i m a t e  p o l i c y
Creating an effective EU energy policy is very often mentioned by 
Polish politicians as one of the top priorities for united Europe. In the ﬁ rst 
half of the seventh term the EP considered a number of legal acts and 
documents important for that policy. 
A regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply 
was provoked by cuts in the supply of gas to some member states that 
occurred as a result of a squabble between Russia and Ukraine at the 
end of 2008. The aim of the act was to create a framework that would 
protect member states in the event of such problems in the future. The 
regulation calls upon the member states to create better connections 
between gas networks to facilitate mutual assistance in the case of 
sudden gas shortages. It also stipulated that pipelines should be ﬁ tted 
with technologies that enable transfer of gas in both directions. The 
introduction of rules that would limit free trade in gas was blocked. Two 
Polish MEPs wrote opinions for the regulation: Jacek Saryusz-Wolski 
(EPP) from the Foreign Affairs Committee and Bogusław Sonik (EPP) 
from the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee. The 
amendments included in Saryusz-Wolski’s text, in particular, reﬂ ected 
ideas that had often been promoted by Polish MEPs and politicians. The 
European Commission was asked to monitor whether companies from 
third countries operating in the EU act in accordance with the rules of the 
Single Market. When negotiating agreements with third countries – gas 
suppliers or transit countries – the Commission should include a special 
gas security clause that would contain a set of rules to be applied in the 
event of a crisis. Another amendment posited that in such situations the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would 
represent the member states in relations with third countries. All Polish 
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MEPs supported the regulation in the vote and they stressed that the act 
was a step in the right direction.17 
Debates on energy-related issues often overlapped with questions 
related to climate and environment protection. The interlinks were 
manifest on the occasion of the adoption of the report on a new Energy 
Strategy for Europe 2011-20, written by Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, a Polish 
MEP from the EPP Group. The report suggested changes to the European 
energy market, calling inter alia for more investments in energy 
infrastructure and for greater diversiﬁ cation of energy supplies. But 
the left-wing political groups insisted on including some declarations 
regarding climate policy as well. One of the issues in question was 
energy efﬁ ciency. The rapporteur managed to muster agreement that 
the EP will not make the declaration to achieve 20% energy savings 
through energy efﬁ ciency legally binding.18 However, the parliamentary 
Left pushed through two other amendments, one of which called upon 
the Commission to consider increasing the target for CO
2 
emission cuts 
by 2020 from 20 to 30%, and the other suggested that the EU reduce CO
2 
emissions by between 80 to 95% by 2050. 
While Polish MEPs were very active in calling for closer cooperation 
on energy issues – just as in the case of the budgetary negotiations 
displaying a very uniﬁ ed stance in this respect – they were vehemently 
against any declarations calling for a more ambitious climate policy. 
They stressed that the economies of the countries of the Central and 
Eastern Europe were already very heavily burdened with the necessity 
to adapt to existing rules. When a report authored by Green MEP Bas 
Eickhout called for increasing the CO
2
 emission reduction target from 20 
to 30% by 2020, Polish MEPs were among the most fervent critics of the 
idea. One day before the vote in plenary, Bogusław Sonik (EPP) and Konrad 
Szymański (ECR) organised a conference aiming to stress the negative 
economic consequences of increasing the reduction targets. They argued 
that adopting overly ambitious targets could be counterproductive 
17 Konrad Szymański, for instance, the most active Polish MEP in the ECR 
Group on energy-related issues, claimed that the regulation was “a step to-
wards energy security.”
18 The pledge regarding energy efﬁ ciency is one of the so-called 20-20-20 
targets. They include cutting CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020, producing 20% 
of energy from renewable sources and reducing the use of energy by 20% 
through energy efﬁ ciency. 
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as it would encourage European companies to move to countries that 
have less stringent rules on CO
2 
emissions. Amendments introduced 
to the report by parliamentarians from EPP, ECR and some Liberals 
affected its content to such an extent that the Greens and the Social 
Democrats decided to vote against it. The amendments proposed by the 
parliamentary Right were supported also by the Polish MEPs from the 
Social Democratic Group, which shows that in this case the Polish MEPs 
again defended very similar opinions. Eventually the report – considered 
crippled by the Left and unnecessary by a large part of the Right – was 
rejected in the ﬁ nal vote. 
The prospect of the extraction of shale gas in Poland and several 
other European countries, as well as the far-reaching economic and 
political consequences of that fact have recently featured prominently 
in Polish political debates. In the ﬁ rst half of the seventh term the EP did 
not consider any legal acts directly linked to that issue, though in March 
2011 a debate took place on the possibility of using gas from alternative 
sources. During the debate Polish MEPs emphasised that in the future 
shale gas may be an important energy source for the EU, and encouraged 
the European Commission to support research concerning methods of 
its extraction. Five out of eighteen speakers in the debate were Poles, 
which demonstrates the importance ascribed to this issue. The debate 
showed that a sizeable group of MEPs is much more sceptical about 
shale gas than the Polish parliamentarians. The MEPs who took the ﬂ oor 
in the name of the Liberal Group and the Greens, evoking the American 
experience, stressed that the extraction of shale gas may have hazardous 
consequences, including poisoning of ground water, the emission 
of large amounts of highly dangerous methane, and even provoking 
earthquakes. 
T h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  c o h e s i o n  p o l i c y
The issue of the cohesion policy featured in many key parliamentary 
debates such as those devoted to the ﬁ nancial crisis and to the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20. The most important document 
that related directly to cohesion was the European Commission’s ﬁ fth 
Report on economic, social and territorial cohesion that was to deﬁ ne the 
main guidelines for the post-2013 cohesion policy. As already mentioned, 
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the effectiveness of the cohesion policy has been questioned by some 
MEPs (members of the Liberal Group and some MEPs coming from the 
most developed Western European countries) who argued that it was no 
longer the best response to the challenges faced by the EU. These views, 
however, represented the position of a parliamentary minority. The EP’s 
report concerning the Commission’s ﬁ fth Cohesion Report, written by 
the German MEP Markus Pieper, emphasised that cohesion policy is still 
relevant and that its principal aim remains to enhance the development 
of disadvantaged regions. It posited that the main aims of the Europe 
2020 strategy – the new overarching EU development strategy – can be 
effectively achieved through cohesion policy. Similarly to the report on 
the MFF, it contained a declaration that in the period between 2014 and 
2020 funds devoted to the policy should be at least the same as in the 
previous multi-year budget. 
Apart from the funds, the structure of the policy was also the subject 
of a heated debate. The European Commission considered making 
serious changes to the policy by giving a more autonomous character 
to several funds devoted to such matters as employment, transport and 
environmental protection. Commissioners responsible for those policy 
areas were said to support the transformation as it would give them more 
resources and clout. The majority in the EP, however, decidedly supported 
the integrated formula. The Pieper report stated that the cohesion policy 
”cannot become a vehicle or instrument serving sectoral issues such as 
policies on research and development, industrial innovation and the ﬁ ght 
against climate change, as this would mean diluting its primary objective 
and placing constraints on its use to promote regions’ development 
potential.”19
The high level of activity of Polish MEPs in the debates on cohesion 
policy clearly demonstrates that this issue provoked a considerable 
amount of attention. In the ﬁ rst half of the seventh term the Regional 
Development Committee had six full members (i.e., 12% of all members) 
from Poland, which gave it the second place in the ranking of committees 
with the highest overrepresentation of Polish MEPs. When taking the 
ﬂ oor in parliamentary debates Polish MEPs defended the record of 
the cohesion policy. They stressed that the policy beneﬁ ts not only the 
19 Report on the Commission’s ﬁ fth Cohesion Report and the strategy for 
post-2013 cohesion policy (2011/2035 (INI)), point 18. 
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countries that receive most of the funds, but also the more developed 
member states from Western Europe. The reforms that the recipients of 
the funds can carry out contribute to increased demand for imports and 
improve the conditions for foreign investments. Poland could boast two 
particularly inﬂ uential MEPs in this realm: the former Commissioner for 
Regional Development, Danuta Hübner, chairwoman of the parliamentary 
Regional Development Committee in the seventh term, and Jan Olbrycht, 
chairman of that committee in the previous term. 
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